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Abstract: Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams’ excellent conference paper, “Inflation Scares and 
Forecast-Based Monetary Policy,” contributes importantly to the new and rapidly growing branch of the 
literature on bounded rationality and learning in macroeconomics. Their paper, like many others, derives 
interesting and useful theoretical results that show how the introduction of bounded rationality and learning 
impacts on the effects of monetary policy shocks and the characteristics of optimal monetary policy rules. This 
note suggests that some additional empirical work—some “irrational expectations econometrics,” if you will—
might serve to make these purely theoretical results seem more relevant and convincing. 
 1 Irrational Expectations ...
Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams’ excellent conference paper, “Inﬂation Scares
and Forecast-Based Monetary Policy,” takes as one of its starting points the observation that
many central banks around the world devote considerable resources towards producing their
own, internal macroeconomic forecasts and towards monitoring private, external macroeco-
nomic forecasts. And, moreover, monetary policy actions taken by central banks around the
world often appear to be driven, at least in part, by changing internal and private macroeco-
nomic forecasts. Within the Federal Reserve System, for example, the Greenbook–which
presents the macroeconomic forecasts generated by the Federal Reserve Board staﬀ–serves
as one of the principal documents guiding the policy deliberations at each meeting of the
Federal Open Market Committee.
Orphanides and Williams’ paper takes its second starting point another observation: that
most contemporary models of the monetary business cycle attach no special importance to
macroeconomic forecasts in the design of monetary policy rules. To see where this result
comes from, and why it holds true so generally, consider a very simple model in which, for
some reason, the central bank decides to set its policy instrument, the short-term nominal
interest rate rt at time t, as a linear function of expected or forecasted output ye
t+1 and
inﬂation πe






where αy and απ are coeﬃcients chosen by the central bank that measure the sensitivity of
the interest rate response to movements in expected output and inﬂation. Next, suppose
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t+1 = δyyt + δππt, (3)
where the reduced-form parameters βy, βπ, δy,a n dδπ may depend in potentially complicated
ways on the model’s underlying structural parameters describing private agents’ tastes and
technologies as well as on the parameters of the monetary policy rule (1). Optimal forecasting
rules take the linear form exhibited by (2) and (3) not just in this simple model but in any
member of the broad class of linear or linearized rational expectations models that have
been developed and used in the literature on monetary economics over the past quarter
century. In more complicated models, additional lags of output and inﬂation as well as
additional lags of other endogenous variables besides output and inﬂation may appear in the
optimal forecasting rules. But the linear form of (2) and (3) will always be preserved by the
linearity of the structural model itself, together with the rational expectations assumption,
which implies that all agents know and use the linear structural model in constructing their
forecasts.
Now, simply substitute the optimal forecasting rules (2) and (3) into the policy rule (1) to
conﬁrm that the forecast-based policy rule (1) adopted by the central bank is fully equivalent
to the outcome-based rule
rt = γyyt + γππt, (4)
with γy = αyβy+απδy and γπ = αyβπ+απδπ, which makes no explicit reference to forecasts
2and instead just calls for the interest rate rt at time t to be adjusted based on movements
in actual output yt and inﬂation πt at time t. The exact equivalence of (1) and (4) implies,
for instance, that if optimal resource allocations are supported by the forecast-based rule
(1), then those same optimal allocations are also supported by the outcome-based rule (4).
In this simple model, as in virtually all of the others used by monetary economists today,
there may be no harm in assigning a role to forecasts in the policymaking process, but at the
same time, there is no special reason to do so: rules that ignore forecasts and depend only
on observed outcomes work just as well. A disconnect therefore appears between central
banking in practice, where forecasts seem to play a very important role, and central banking
in theory, where they do not.
In their paper, Orphanides and Williams skillfully highlight one major source of this
disconnect: the assumption, maintained throughout virtually all of the literature from the
past 25 years, that agents have full knowledge of the economy’s true structure and form
their forecasts rationally and optimally based on that complete knowledge. More speciﬁcally,
Orphanides and Williams begin by constructing a linear rational expectations model of the
monetary business cycle that shares the same basic features possessed by most other popular
speciﬁcations that are used today. However, they subsequently depart from this benchmark
by assuming that private agents lack the ability to use optimal forecasting rules like (2)
and (3) from above. Instead of having rational expectations, the agents in Orphanides and
Williams’ framework generate forecasts using a simple econometric model–an econometric
model that is, moreover, misspeciﬁed in that it is designed to reﬂect the agents’ belief that
the coeﬃcients of the true model drift randomly over time, even though this parameter drift
never actually occurs.
Through a variety of numerical exercises, Orphanides and Williams show how, in this
3economy without rational expectations, the equivalence between forecast-based and outcome-
based policy rules illustrated by the comparison of (1) and (4) from above breaks down. These
exercises reveal that in this model of bounded rationality and learning–that is, in this model
of irrational expectations–the central bank ﬁnds considerable value in adjusting its policy
instrument in response to changes in both forecasts and outcomes, just as, evidently, central
banks in the real world ﬁnd it desirable to monitor and respond to changes in both forecasts
and outcomes.
To be sure, these results are interesting and important. My ﬁrst comment, therefore, is
just to say that I like the paper very much, learned a lot from reading it, and would recom-
mend it highly to anyone with an interest in monetary economics. My second comment is to
call for some empirical work that might usefully serve to complement the purely theoretical
results that are presented in this paper–and throughout the branch of the literature on
bounded rationality and learning in macroeconomics to which this paper contributes.
2 ... and Econometric Practice
Orphanides and Williams’ paper presents an interesting and important theoretical result:
that a special role for forecast-based monetary policy rules–a role that is absent in most
conventional, rational expectations models–emerges in an environment in which private
agents are boundedly rational and perpetually trying to learn about the true structure of
the economy. Orphanides and Williams’ paper, like most of the others presented at this
conference, thereby contributes to an already large, but still rapidly growing, branch of the
literature in macroeconomics that explores, theoretically, how the introduction of bounded
rationality and learning impacts on the eﬀects of monetary policy shocks and the character-
istics of optimal monetary policy rules. Once again, to be sure, this branch of the literature
4has produced many useful results and insights. What is sorely missing from this branch of
the literature, however, is any empirical or econometric work that might serve to make the
purely theoretical results obtained so far seem more relevant and convincing.
One very nice feature of Orphanides and Williams’ model is that it nests the conventional
rational expectations speciﬁcation as the special case in which the constant gain parameter
κ used by private agents in their recursive least squares learning and estimation procedure
converges to zero. Another very nice feature of Orphanides and Williams’ model is that it
implies that diﬀerent settings for this parameter κ lead to very diﬀerent implications for the
volatility and persistence of movements in output and inﬂation. Why not build on these
theoretical results, and attempt to estimate the parameters of this model, including the
key parameter κ, using actual time-series data on output and inﬂation from the postwar
US economy together with formal econometric methods? The results of such an exercise
could then be used to assess how allowing κ to diﬀer from zero–that is, how allowing for a
departure from rational expectations–helps improve the model’s ﬁt.
In the ﬁeld of agricultural economics, two absolute l yf a s c i n a t i n gs t u d i e sb yB a a k( 1 9 9 9 )
and Chavas (2000) successfully perform econometric exercises of exactly this nature. Both
of these studies start by outlining a dynamic, stochastic model of the US cattle market
in which private agents are assumed to have fully rational expectations. Both of these
studies then go on to perturb the rational expectations benchmark in ways that allow, but
do not require, some agents to be boundedly rational instead. Baak (1999) estimates his
model via maximum likelihood and ﬁnds that the best ﬁt is provided by a variant in which
approximately one-third of all agents are boundedly rational; he ﬁnds, also, that a likelihood
ratio test rejects the constrained version of the model in which all agents have rational
expectations. Chavas (2000), meanwhile, uses a generalized method of moments estimation
5procedure instead; his results, too, strongly support the hypothesis that the introduction of
boundedly rational agents works to improve the model’s ability to track movements in the
data. These studies serve to demonstrate that “irrational expectations econometrics” can
yield results that are sharp, useful, and convincing. In macroeconomics, however, Sargent’s
(1999) volume represents the only published attempt that I am aware of to actually estimate
and test a model with boundedly rational agents.
Years ago, Hansen and Sargent (1980) famously declared that “cross-equation restric-
tions” are the “hallmark of rational expectations models.” But please look again at Or-
phanides and Williams’ results, which reveal, ﬁrst, that the dynamic behavior of output
and inﬂa t i o ni nt h e i rm o d e li ss t r o n g l yi n ﬂuenced by the learning process used by private
agents and, second, that the learning process used by private agents is itself inﬂuenced, in
turn, by the characteristics of the monetary policy rule chosen by the central bank. These
results suggest, therefore, that cross-equation restrictions are imposed not just by rational
expectations models, but by many other models like Orphanides and Williams’ in which the
process through which agents form their expectations is described carefully and completely.
Just as they do in rational expectations models, the cross-equation restrictions that emerge
out of models with boundedly rationality and learning provide potentially powerful chan-
nels through which key parameters can be econometrically identiﬁed and through which key
hypotheses can be econometrically tested.
That famous paper by Hansen and Sargent (1980), by the way, also appears in an edited
volume titled Rational Expectations and Econometric Practice (Lucas and Sargent 1981) that
collects some of the most important studies produced during the early stages of the rational
expectations revolution. As Orphanides and Williams’ paper and many of the other papers
presented at this conference reveal, macroeconomists have become increasingly willing to
6depart from the rational expectations hypothesis–today, it seems that we may witnessing
the early stages of an “irrational expectations revolution.” What this new revolution needs
to succeed, I suggest, is some “econometric practice” to go along with the theoretical work
that we’ve already seen.
3 References
Baak, Saang Joon. “Tests for Bounded Rationality with a Linear Dynamic Model Dis-
torted by Heterogenous Expectations.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
23 (September 1999): 1517-1543.
Chavas, Jean-Paul. “On Information and Market Dynamics: The Case of the U.S. Beef
Market.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 24 (June 2000): 833-853.
Hansen, Lars Peter and Thomas J. Sargent. “Formulating and Estimating Dynamic Lin-
ear Rational Expectations Models.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 2
(February 1980): 7-46.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. and Thomas J. Sargent, eds. Rational Expectations and Econometric
Practice. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981.
Sargent, Thomas J. The Conquest of American Inﬂation. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1999.
7